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Introduction 
“Of course, it is easy to say that the events of the Arab Spring were no war, 
so we, military, have nothing to study there. Well, maybe the opposite is 
true and precisely this the typical 21st century war?” 
Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, First 
Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation (Gerasimov 2013, 2) 
Vladimir Putin was elected president of the Russian Federation in 2000 and reelected for the second 
term in 2004. He then served as a prime minister under president Dmitry Medvedev to take a break from 
his second consecutive term. During this ‘interregnum’ the presidential terms were extended from four 
to six years and in 2012 Putin became eligible to run for president again, with the next elections coming 
in 2018. He is now challenged by opposition activist Alexei Navalny:  
“Nowadays in Russia one can achieve something only by the means of organized protest and demonstrations. 
Any problem has to be politicized. People, who claim that their protest is ‘non-political’ lose at that very instant.” 
(Navalny, 2017) 
Despite the rare protest actions organized by the opposition, Putin’s support rating has reached its 
historical maximum and now exceeds 85%, according to the official estimates – quite tellingly, regardless 
of the fact whether this number is accurate (Politov 2016). However, the memory of color revolutions in 
neighboring countries, the Arab Spring and Ukrainian Euromaidan is still fresh and continues to throw a 
shadow on the Kremlin, as Putin had to deal with them throughout almost the entire period he has been 
in power. For the Russian elites, these revolutions formed a dual threat – both to their domestic power 
and Russian position on the international arena. Ever since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the 
confrontation between Russia and ‘the West’, that is the US, NATO, and less unambiguously EU, has been 
growing once again. Over these years, Russia has earned a reputation of an unpredictable, threatening 
and opportunistic actor, despite all the reasons it has to cooperate with the Western countries. This 
paper analyzes the Russian rationale behind its reaction to the revolutions of 2004 – 2014 and the 
instruments it is using in its information warfare.  
 
In 1989, a series of peaceful revolutions took place throughout Eastern Europe, including the Velvet 
Revolution in Czechoslovakia and Singing Revolution in the Baltics, which led to the overthrow of 
communist regimes and allowed these countries to make a swift transition to the Western-style liberal 
democracy. However, this was only the beginning of political turmoil in the region. The Belavezha Accords 
of 1991, which finalized the disintegration of the Soviet Union, did not systematically address its legal and 
administrative consequences, as many believed that the cooperation between the newly formed 
independent states would continue and eventually draw them back together. Russia naturally saw itself 
as a legitimate successor of the Soviet Union and felt committed to restore its former influence. 
Ten years after the fall of the Soviet Union people took to the streets once again. Starting with the 
Bulldozer Revolution in Serbia in 2000, a wave of revolutions, now electoral, swept through Georgia (Rose 
Revolution, 2003), Ukraine (Orange Revolution 2004), Kyrgyzstan  (Tulip Revolution, 2005) and few other 
countries in the region, including several failed attempts in Azerbaijan, Belarus and Armenia, with 
Moldova being probably the last country with a government that was almost displaced by a revolution of 
this type in 2009. During this period, Russia’s geopolitical interests and ambitions began to clash with ‘the 
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West’, primarily the US, more and more openly. President Vladimir Putin, after being reelected for his 
second term, started to consolidate his power and the Kremlin grew more assertive, also in its foreign 
policy. In 2010 – 2011, there has been some civil unrest in neighboring Ukraine, but more importantly, 
the following couple of years have been marked by protests in Russia itself, including the Bolotnaya 
protest movement against the 2011 legislative election results when opposition rallies were held in 
Moscow, St. Petersburg and other major Russian cities. 
The overarching term ‘color revolutions’ was coined when protesters in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan 
explicitly stated, that they were indebted to the Orange Revolution, which became a symbol of civil 
opposition in post-communist authoritarian states. In Russia, the term ‘orange revolutions’ is sometimes 
even being used instead of ‘color revolutions’ (Kara-Murza 2005, 9). The Orange Revolution of 2004 
marked a turning point in Russia-Ukraine relations, which culminated in a dramatic crisis another ten 
years later during the Maidan of 2014, dubbed the Revolution of Dignity. This revolution concluded the 
series of ‘square revolutions’ which were brought about by the Arab Spring and took place in the main 
squares of big (usually capital) cities from Cairo in 2011 to Istanbul in 2013. Square revolutions, unlike the 
electoral color revolutions, are characterized by the absence of strong political leadership and greater 
role for ‘the people’ who stood up for their democratic freedoms. They also have ushered in more 
violence than the preceding revolutions. 
During Vladimir Putin’s second (2004 – 2008) and third (2012 – present) presidential terms, which 
coincided with the revolution waves, Russia got more heavy-handed in its foreign as well as domestic 
policy. These revolutions, despite their different origins and objectives, are viewed as one continuous 
period in this paper as it has already been shown that mass protests were a more or less constant feature 
of the post-Soviet political landscape since the early 2000’s. From the perspective of Kremlin’s reaction 
against them, both color and square revolutions can be seen as two stages of the same process, even 
though ‘color revolutions’ is a catchier and better known term, still widely used in Russia (Sivkov 2013; 
“Putin” 2014). To avoid repetition, I have labeled them together as the ‘democratic revolutions’.  The 
word ‘democratic’ refers here to democracy as a typically ‘Western’ value, increasingly seen by Russia as 
alien, threatening and opposed to its own traditions and culture. Moreover, this element is an important 
part of the Russian official discourse against the color and square revolutions. 
Russian political elites have been quite straightforward and undivided in their reaction. They invariably 
describe the revolutions as regime change attempts, which lead to the overthrow of legitimate 
governments and their replacement with pro-Western regimes, and were thus ultimately meant as 
potential rehearsals of a coup d’ état in Moscow itself staged by the ‘Western actors’. The complex 
domestic structural causes of these revolutions are typically being overlooked (Khudoley 2016, 391-393). 
In his interview with the Bloomberg agency in 2009, Putin stated that ‘what happened with Ukraine in 
recent years was the result to a significant degree of the activities of the previous US administration and 
the European Union, which supported it’ (“Interview Vladimira Putina” 2009). Furthermore, Russia’s chief 
foreign policy objective is to maintain its sphere of influence on the CIS member-states, as according to 
Dmitry Medvedev, ‘there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests’ (Wilson 2010, 32).  
According to this logic, the Russian leadership had to take hard uncompromising measures in order to 
counter the security threat of democratic revolutions. During the Russian Federation Security Council 
meeting in 2014 Putin left no doubts about the Kremlin’s position:  
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“In the modern world extremism is being used as a geopolitical instrument for the repartition of the spheres of 
influence. We all can see the tragic consequences of the so-called color revolutions and the damage they have 
inflicted on the people of the countries, which have undergone irresponsible covert and overt interventions in 
their lives. For us, it is a lesson and a warning and we will do everything for it to never happen in Russia.” (“Putin” 
2014) 
 
The democratic revolutions have significantly influenced Russian foreign and domestic policy over the 
past decade. This paper provides a theoretical framework for the analysis of the Russian reaction to the 
revolutions of 2004 – 2014 in surrounding countries, focusing especially on the intensification of 
information warfare in the run up to the Russia-Ukraine crisis, which was partly the result of these 
revolutions. Under the umbrella of information warfare, this research combines methods, concepts and 
theories of Russian origin with traditional academic approaches from the field of International Relations 
in order to provide a theoretical framework for the analysis of domestic and foreign policy adjustments 
that have been made primarily during Vladimir Putin’s second and third presidential terms. The Russia-
Ukraine crisis is the most outspoken, clear-cut manifestation of these strategies and will be used as a case 
study to show their working while at the same time providing focus and delimitation for the study. 
Information warfare is understood in this context as an ongoing activity that comprises different 
means of information influence for political goals, including primarily propaganda, rather than specific 
technological operations like cyber-attacks. The glossary of the Russian Military Academy of the General 
Staff draws a clear distinction between the narrow Western definition of information warfare, which 
limits it to tactical operations during military conflicts, and the broad Russian one, according to which it is 
waged constantly in peacetime on both domestic and international scale. In a sense, information warfare 
is the Russian answer to Western soft power, which is seen by the Kremlin as a weapon of US strategists 
used to undermine Russian power position (Sivkov 2013; Khudoley 2016, 390-391; Giles 2016, 41).  
The democratic revolutions have shown, that many post-Soviet countries, for example, Ukraine with 
its ’European choice’, are leaning towards the EU and show desire to join NATO . That is what Russia sees 
as an infringement into its own sphere of influence, which has to be countered at all costs (Sivkov 2013, 
1). Information warfare has become a constant feature of Russian political and social life, not least 
because of the democratic revolutions threat (Giles 2016, 4, 17). For the analysis of manipulation 
techniques that are part of Russian information warfare, the first chapter provides a toolkit, which 
consists of grand theory framing and basic Security Studies concepts like securitization and security 
dispositives on the one hand, and the main principles of Russian military strategy with special attention 
for the new generation warfare and deception as embodied in the notion of reflexive control on the 
other. The assumption here is that this theoretical framework can explain why Russia behaves the way it 
does as it adds a new layer of understanding by and combining traditional academic approaches with 
practical ones that are being used by the Kremlin in order to reproduce the Russian way of thinking. 
It is striking how the Russian leadership sees the world of international relations as a Hobbesian one. 
Even despite being openly against any large scale military conflicts, Russia still depicts every aspect of its 
relations with ‘the West’ in terms of war and rivalry, with the only difference that information is now 
being used instead of armed forces (Tretyakov 2016). Vladimir Putin, educated and trained to be a 
counter-insurgency officer, made a brilliant career from a KGB officer to Federal Security Service (FSB) 
Director to the president of the Russian Federation and is familiar with the military strategy and crucial to 
information warfare reflexive control theory, which is a part of the KGB ‘school programme’. The same 
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goes for other siloviki from Putin’s nearest entourage – people who are or have been involved with the 
‘power ministries’ (like the Ministry of Defense or Internal Affairs) and security services, for example ‘the 
hawk of Russian foreign policy’ Dmitry Rogozin, Minister of Defense Sergey Shoygu, Secretary of the 
Security Council and former FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev and the Chief of General Staff Valery 
Gerasimov Duncan 2012, 1). This is by no means the only influential group in the Kremlin (“Za Krym” 
2014), but it will be central to this research. 
The information on Russia’s actual information warfare is drawn from the Western  academic 
literature (Giles 2016; Thomas 2015), Russian primary sources and, most importantly, Russian academic 
journals. Military Thought (Военная мысль) is the main official journal of the Ministry of Defense of the 
Russian Federation, virtually since 1918. Other influential military theoretic journals are Military Historical 
Journal (Военно-исторический журнал), Military Industrial Courier (Военно-промышленный курьер) 
and the Journal of the Academy of Military Sciences (Вестник Академии военных наук). Their 
significance – at least from the research perspective, is proved by the fact that influential siloviki like 
Patrushev and Gerasimov, along with other high-ranked officials, are among their frequent contributors. 
These publications are a quite reliable source of information as they link military theory with political 
practice and reveal about as much about the current Russian strategy trends, as it is possible to uncover 
for an outsider who does not have access to any special documentation.  
In academic literature, there is considerable debate on whether the color and square revolutions have 
been successful or failed as a phenomenon as well as in particular cases (Åslund 2006; Cooley 2010; Hale 
2006; Kurilla 2010; Kuzio 2017). However, regardless of their actual democratizing effect, the revolutions 
have undoubtedly destabilized the post-Soviet space and made Russia a possible candidate for the next 
one. Moreover, the new regimes were not as eager to cooperate with the Kremlin as before. The two 
revolutions in Ukraine were especially disturbing for Russia as they happened on its very doorstep and 
interfered with Russia’s own strategic plans not only in regard to Ukraine, but the whole region. Ukraine’s 
‘European choice’ automatically harmed Russian-led integration projects, which were crucial for Russia in 
order to strengthen its power position on the international arena (Dragneva & Wolczuk 2016, 693). 
The analysis and examples from the second and third chapters will show that the Russian leadership is 
indeed very ‘technical’ with its information warfare strategy and successfully applies theory in practice. 
Here, the focus is on theoretical explanation of grand strategy of the information warfare and official 
discourse which comes along with it. The purpose of this research is to demonstrate that understanding 
the reasons for Kremlin’s unambiguously harsh reaction to the democratic revolutions requires 
knowledge of underlying ideas, perceptions and motives, which have shaped the ‘coordinate system’ 
inside of which the Russian leadership operates. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to have ‘insider’ 
insights and knowledge of traditional Russian strategic thought as well as be able to take distance from 
this perspective and reflect on it – hence the choice for a mix of academic approaches with more practical 
concepts, which form a joint analytical toolkit. The second chapter is written from a realist perspective 
and deals with the Russian foreign policy analyzed in terms of grand strategy in order to explain why 
Russia reacted to the democratic revolutions the way it did and what is the rationale behind information 
warfare. The third ‘technical’ chapter written from a constructivist perspective proceeds to analyze how 
information warfare is implemented, first through the lens of securitization and then by explaining 
Russian propagandist discourse in terms of reflexive control.  
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Chapter I: Analytical Toolkit 
The subject and methodology of this research belong to the domain of International Relations (IR), 
which developed as a subdiscipline of Political Science in the modern sense in the US during the Cold 
War. It remains a hierarchical social science, which incorporates a multitude of diverging schools of 
thought and approaches, with the most authoritative academic journals concentrated in America and 
there is probably hardly another discipline that produces so much writing on itself and is torn by ongoing 
‘great debates’ (Ole Wæver 2013, 313, 315). Neoliberalism, for example, is indeed well suited for 
explaining a world inhabited by international organizations and liberal democracies prevalent in the West 
(Anderson 2000, 17; Snyder 2009). However, the post-Soviet space dominated by Russia requires a 
different perspective. In its foreign policy, Russia emphatically operates within the realist paradigm, which 
can be traced back to the writings by Thucydides, Hobbbes and Machiavelli. It is dominated by perpetual 
conflict and the very life in it is war. They key assumption of realism is that in an anarchic world with no 
higher authority above the states, power is crucial to survival. Despite the fact that classical realists and 
neorealists have divergent opinions on whether power only matters as a means of survival or is a goal in 
itself, the difference is irrelevant to this study (Mearsheimer 2013, 78).  
After a brief discussion on realism and constructivism, which form the general grand theory setting for 
further analysis, this chapter proceeds from general to more specific concepts. The first section deals 
with Security Studies, primarily as understood by the Copenhagen School, which combines both 
neorealist and constructivist elements. The next section is dedicated to military strategy, basic Strategic 
Studies concepts and academic debate within the field. Lastly, this chapter focuses on manipulation and 
deception from the theoretical perspective of reflexive control. It must be noted, that traditional 
academic approaches like grand theories or securitization can be applied ‘from without’ to assess state 
policies, while the actual strategy and manipulative techniques from the second and third sections are 
used by the Russian leadership itself. The next chapters will thus combine one academic and one 
‘practical’ approach each. 
A realist post-bipolar world is a perfect theoretical backdrop for president Putin’s policy with his 
competitive logic, affinity for Realpolitik and a KGB past. This argument is backed by the fact, that Russian 
politicians, Putin in particular, operate within this paradigm themselves and use realist terms like ‘spheres 
of influence’ and ‘balance of power’ in their statements and speeches (Bonicelli 2015; “Putin” 2014). 
Moreover, it is an especially rewarding theoretical environment for explaining noticeable military strategy 
influences in Kremlin’s policy without necessarily implying an actual war or conflict. Vladimir Putin 
officially has decisive influence on the Russian strategy and the last say over the Military Doctrine and 
Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, so that it is safe to argue that his personal competitive 
opportunist logic is reflected in Russian revanchist foreign policy and goes along the lines of Realpolitik 
(Thomas 2015, 460; Bonicelli 2015). This term is not synonymous to realism as grand theory, but rather 
fits into the realist way of thinking, especially as described by Machiavelli. Realpolitik denotes politics 
where decisions are based on pragmatic evaluation of the situation and given circumstances, instead of 
certain moral principles and ethics.  
Moscow has gotten itself involved in a zero-sum game, where any potential gain for Russia’s perceived 
adversaries would mean loss to Russia as well as Putin personally, and vice versa, so that this ‘game of 
chess’ cannot end without an absolute winner and a loser (Mearsheimer 2014). As a legal successor to 
the Soviet Union, Russia has also inherited the Soviet Cold War legacy and views eastward NATO 
expansion as a potential threat to its own position in the region. According to the same logic, the EU 
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integration initiatives are also increasingly being seen as a part of geopolitical balancing against Russia 
(Dragneva & Wolczuk 2014, 221; Kuzio 2017, 104). From this perspective, security tensions in the post-
Soviet space can be explained in terms of security dilemma also known as the spiral model. According to 
it, most steps a state takes to enhance its security decrease that of other states so that just trying to 
preserve status quo does not work in certain situations or is even impossible at some point, which leads 
to constant military buildup and a threat of escalation (Mearsheimer 2013, 80). In this study, it will be 
argued, that for Russia, the color revolutions formed such point of no return, which became entrenched 
after the Russia-Ukraine crisis.  
However, while Russian foreign policy in the region naturally lends itself to a realist interpretation, an 
analytical approach undertaken in this paper calls for additional framework with a focus on discourses 
and discursive practices suited for the analysis of information warfare, Russian ‘political technologies’ and 
propaganda. Such a framework is provided by the constructivist theory, which holds that major aspects of 
international relations are socially constructed rather than predetermined by human nature or structural 
features of a political system. This approach emphasizes the constructed character of discourses, 
identities, norms and ways of behavior in a fundamentally social context (Fierke 2013, 187-202). 
Constructivism started out as a critique of grand theories and is heavily influenced by the ‘linguistic turn’ 
in philosophy with its attention to  language and the ways it is used as an instrument to shape and give 
meaning to the world we live in. Moreover, by highlighting the meaning-making aspect of any social 
relations, it provides a methodological toolkit for the analysis of power mechanisms in politics. From the 
constructivist point of view, any policy is first and foremost aimed at normative regime legitimization 
through construction of domestic national identity and external threats or enemies. Legitimacy sustained 
by such propagandist discourse is crucial for the regime to gain nationwide support in order to stay in 
power, while at the same time it is also capable of influencing the country’s relationship with and the 
image of the ‘Others’, therefore justifying its foreign policy (Shakhrai 2015, 29). Concepts described in the 
first section are essentially constructivist, although they do have a realist backdrop. 
Copenhagen School and securitization 
Security is an important part of this framework as it forms a crucial link between the realist strife for 
power and survival on the one hand, and the underlying necessity to legitimize the regime on the other – 
were it for the elites to stay in power or for preserving the integrity of the entire state. It is defined as the 
anticipation of being unharmed in the future (De Graaf & Zwierlein 2013, 52). In here the temporal 
element, namely ‘future’, is crucial. The goal of any security policy is to create or assure such feeling for 
the citizens and the state itself. A tangible threat does not necessarily have to exist at a given moment – 
otherwise that would mean that a security policy is already failing. It is rather about potential dangers 
which can arise in the future, which makes security an elusive concept subject to manipulation. In 
practice therefore, security policies are not limited to finding and eliminating potential threats but can 
also be used to evoke them or create artificial ones in order to enable security policies that may be crucial 
for normative regime legitimation and consolidation of power (Shakhrai 2015). 
Security Studies as an academic subfield of the IR developed in the course of the Cold War and used to 
focus primarily on nuclear deterrence. Overtime, however, the focus shifted to organized violence, so 
that Security Studies came to encompass virtually everything from individual conflicts and terrorism to 
crisis management and grand politics. Especially after 9/11, the discipline started to shift from studying 
actual conflicts to peacetime security issues under the influence of constructivism (Diskaya 2013). 
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Following the general development within IR, critical approaches and schools of thought started 
appearing, with Copenhagen School being the most prominent one among them. 
Copenhagen School has its origin in Barry Buzan’s book People, States and Fear. Most representatives 
of this school are connected with the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute. The two best-known 
scientists usually associated with this school are IR experts Jaap de Wilde and Ole Wæver. The main 
principles of Copenhagen School are laid down in the book Security: A New Framework for Analysis by 
Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde. Copenhagen School offers a solid methodological framework 
that provides new insights into long-term security developments through the securitization concept (De 
Graaf & Zwierlein 2013, 50-51). Its representatives take neorealism as a starting point and share a 
conventional military understanding of security with traditional security scholars. One of the key 
assumptions of this school of thought is that security is about survival. In the world of international 
relations, a security issue arises when something poses an existential threat to a certain object. Thus, 
issues can become securitized, which means that they require decisive measures to be taken immediately 
in order to counter the threat (Diskaya 2013). 
This is where the essentially constructivist concept of securitization comes in. It has been developed 
by Ole Wæver in 1995 and implies that the crucial element of security is not the objective fact whether a 
threat is real or not, but the way in which certain phenomena, problems or groups can be socially 
constructed as a threat. Here, security is redefined as a socially embedded process of political ‘meaning-
making’ instead of being limited to a mere rational response to an objective threat (De Graaf & Zwierlein 
2013, 49). The actors, who deliberately choose to securitize certain issues, can get the opportunity to 
implement measures, which would never be accepted by the citizens in normal circumstances, if not for 
the intense threat image that arose as a result of securitization (Munster 2012). Therefore, by defining an 
issue as existential threat, the actor who does so acquires more power and can consolidate his authority 
in order to handle it effectively as now the very survival of a state has been put at stake. However, for the 
securitization to work, target audience needs to be convinced that the threat is grave enough before a 
security issue can be raised above the normal sphere of politics (Diskaya 2013). 
As it has already been mentioned, the act of securitization per definition requires persuading broad 
audience of an existing threat. One of Ole Wæver’s early works, which probably lies at the root of 
securitization theory, is tellingly titled “Security, the Speech Act” and has been heavily influenced by the 
linguistic turn. Simply put, the main message of this work is that because of the fact that security issues 
arise as soon as something is articulated as a threat, security (or securitization as a process, for that 
matter) is first and foremost a speech act. The underlying assumption here is that the words are never on 
their own, but always directly refer to actions or developments in a social environment (Fierke 2013, 
197). Therefore, securitization combines this particular understanding of ‘security’ and links it directly to 
discursive practice. In effect, securitization is an act of successfully attaching ‘security’ attributes to a 
particular case or process. 
Yet another layer of analysis that is integral to the process of securitization is added by security 
dispositives, which have first been introduced by Michel Foucault in his lecture Sécurité, territoire, 
population in the seventies, made public only in 2004. Security dispositives are social structures that are 
also based on discursive practices and evoked in the name of a potential security threat. Foucault defines 
dispositive as a heterogenous entity that encompasses the interplay between lingual and non-lingual 
expressions of power relations at a given moment, such as discourses, institutions, laws and regulations 
or even architecture. (De Graaf & Zwierlein 2013, 51). Thus, while securitization helps to explain the 
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general development of security policy, dispositives describe the structure and characteristic features of 
these processes.  
However, Foucault focused exclusively on internal security. Dutch security expert Beatrice de Graaf 
has given this concept another dimension. She added conspiracy dispositives to it and placed both into an 
international setting (Zwierlein & de Graaf 2013, 32-33). De Graaf outlines the most important elements 
of dispositives. Firstly, security dispositives always have a spatial dimension and are usually attached to a 
certain state. Secondly, security dispositives bring along a certain set of values, such as order, discipline 
and a sense of community. Thirdly, the citizens are both actors and objects of this interplay of power 
relations and security becomes an instrument of governing society. Therefore, security dispositives are 
bound to get politicized and demand political legitimation (De Graaf & Zwierlein 2013, 52-53). 
International setting is an integral feature of conspiracy dispositives, which are subordinate to security 
dispositives. They can be used to ascribe a threat to a certain group or event and thus give it a face by 
identifying where the danger comes from and who the enemies are. It is only convenient, that 
conspiracies are intangible and their existence is very hard to prove in reality – so for a conspiracy 
dispositive to successfully perform its function, an actual conspiracy does not have to exist as this method 
is essentially about manipulating fear-driven ideas about it. An important by-product of securitization by 
the means of dispositives is that the line between internal and external security becomes blurred – so it 
becomes possible to implement hard measures and combine domestic repression with assertive foreign 
policy. 
In the context of this paper, the notion of conspiracy is hardly applicable. However, the elements and 
main function of conspiracy dispositives help to illustrate how by pointing out an enemy one can 
legitimize own tougher policy and use a security threat as a unifying factor (De Graaf & Zwierlein 2013, 
57). It should be possible to identify other sub-security dispositives, for example the revolution ones, as all 
of them share the same features and functions. In this case, revolution dispositives serve to identify 
democratic revolutions as an evil and tie them to a certain group of people (any protesters) or state (most 
prominently, Ukraine) in order to create an image which can then be used in the main security 
dispositive, which is primarily about the Russian sovereignty and legitimacy of the Russian government, 
contrasted against the countries which have had a revolution that resulted in a regime change. 
Dispositives will be used in the third chapter to show how the democratic revolutions came to be 
securitized. 
New generation warfare 
The discipline of Strategic Studies also deals with the issues of security and power, bridging the gap 
between the domains of politics and war. This interdisciplinary academic field has the same origins and 
dynamics as Security Studies. Just like the former, it used to focus on the nuclear threat during the Cold 
War, but has been transformed after 9/11. Strategic Studies received renewed attention as security 
environment started changing and irregular warfare, peacekeeping missions and revolutions have 
become more relevant than ever. Despite the interconnectedness with the Security Studies, Strategic 
Studies has an own intellectual tradition with deep historical roots. On the one hand, this tradition 
reaches back to Ancient China with its crown jewel the Art of War by Sun Tzu (544-496 BC) – probably the 
most iconic treatise on warfare ever written. On the other, it remains rooted in the European military 
thought heavily influenced by Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) and his book On War (Lonsdale 2016, 22). 
Furthermore, the distinct Russian strategic tradition takes a special place in this research as it combines 
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both Eastern and Western military thought. This section first deals with the definitions, general features 
and levels of strategy. It then proceeds to examine Russian strategy, its main principles, basic theoretical 
assumptions and practical implications, including the discussion on the new generation of warfare, 
information- and ‘hybrid’ warfare. 
There is no universal consensus on a single standard definition of strategy as it may refer to 
completely different, sometimes not even overlapping concepts – as in ‘business strategy’ or ‘strategic 
management’, that have nothing to do with the topic of his research. According to Colin Gray, strategy is 
‘the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy’ (Lonsdale 2016, 40). Here, the 
threat of force is key – especially in conjunction with security implications as outlined above. Despite its 
strong association with warfare, military force does not have to play a role in strategy, especially under 
the premise of a realist environment, which is per definition anarchic, hostile and characterized by a 
perpetual struggle for power. At this point, it is important to distinguish different levels of strategy. The 
lowest tactical level is indeed about disposing and maneuvering military units in the field, while military 
and operational strategy involves planning at higher levels of command. More relevant for this study, 
though, is the grand strategy, which overlaps with foreign policy and can employ many instruments, 
military force being only one of many options (Lonsdale 2016, 42-44). Strategy is thus highly adaptable 
and can always be scaled up or down (Lonsdale 2016, 40).  
Furthermore, there are multiple ways to use military force without actually engaging in a war or any 
kind of direct confrontation. While offence and defense do imply actual use of physical force, deterrence, 
compellence and posturing are only indirectly founded thereupon. Deterrence is used for dissuading an 
adversary from taking action under a threat of force or punishment, while compellence refers to either 
pressuring an opponent into doing something he has not yet done or stopping him from doing what he 
has already started. Posturing, the display of military force, can serve to both ends and is often meant for 
making a general impression rather than achieving a specific objective. Moreover, there are other non-
military uses of force, such as policing or humanitarian aid (Lonsdale 2016, 62-65).  
One of the most prominent Russian strategists who has had a significant impact on the modern 
Russian military thought is Alexander Svechin (1878-1938), who defined strategy as follows:  
“Strategy is the art of combining preparations for war and the grouping of operations for achieving the goal set 
by the war for the AF [armed forces]. Strategy decides issues associated with the employment of the Armed 
Forces and all the resources of a country for achieving ultimate war aims.” (Svechin 1992, 69) 
The core of this definition is outspokenly military. However, the Soviet military thought has undergone 
further refinement in recent years as his ideas have been combined with new insights and techniques. In 
Russia, there are several authoritative military- theoretic journals, like Military Thought and Military 
Industrial Courier that are part of this process. The main message of the modern Russian strategic 
thought is that wars are now fought in the information environment rather than on the battlefields 
(Thomas 2013, 454). Non-military and asymmetrical methods aimed at offsetting opponents’ superiority 
and exploiting their weaknesses have become key in achieving strategic political goals for Russia as the 
Kremlin’s military strategic focus has shifted towards unconventional irregular warfare, which implies 
avoidance of direct confrontation and is meant to be used against relatively more powerful opponents, 
with significantly different strategy and tactics. To be even more specific, according to Valery Gerasimov, 
non-military operations are to occur at a rate of 4:1 over the military ones (Thomas 2015, 455). This 
seems to be exactly what Putin is aiming at:  
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“Our responses are to be based on intellectual superiority; they will be asymmetrical and less costly.” (Chekinov & 
Bogdanov 2010, 21) 
Consequently, Russian military strategy came to be typically described by Western experts as hybrid 
warfare (Banasik 2016), even though Russian officials and military do not use this term themselves too 
eagerly. Gerasimov has never mentioned hybrid warfare, even though the General Staff clearly prefers 
non-military methods to military ones and uses them in conjunction. However, in Military Thought one 
can find contradictory opinions. A few authors explicitly state that hybrid warfare ‘is not exactly the right 
term and is slightly at odds with the glossary used in this country’s military science’ (Adrianov & Loyko 
2015, 68). On the other hand, Sergey Chekinov, head of the Centre for Military Strategic Research of the 
Russian General Staff Academy, does use hybrid warfare as an alternative term in his prognosis on the 
future of wars and associates it directly with information warfare:  
“Wars will be resolved by a skillful combination of military, nonmilitary, and special nonviolent measures that will 
be put through by a variety of forms and methods and a blend of political, economic, informational, 
technological, and environmental measures, primarily by taking advantage of information superiority. 
Information warfare in the new conditions will be the starting point of every action now called the new type of 
warfare, or hybrid war, in which broad use will be made of the mass media and, where feasible, global computer 
networks.” (Chekinov & Bogdanov 2015, 44-45) 
Thus, hybrid warfare might be a helpful, albeit not very ‘authentic’ analytical concept vis-à-vis the 
Russian new-generation warfare, which has accumulated ultra-traditional strategic notions and 
successfully adapted them to the recent developments in Russian policy, with the democratic revolutions 
being an important stimulus of these changes. Gerasimov states with reference to Svechin that ‘it is 
necessary to work out a particular line of strategic conduct for each war, and each war represents a 
particular case, requiring the establishment of its own peculiar logic, and not the application of some sort 
of model’ (Gerasimov 2013, 1; Thomas 2015, 453). 
Reflexive control 
The most basic assumption about war is that war is essentially about deception. It was coined by Sun 
Tzu in Ancient China about 2,500 years ago and has been the cornerstone of military thought ever since 
not only in the East, but in the West as well – consider Machiavelli’s Prince. Another important postulate 
from the Art of War by Sun Tzu is that ‘the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting’ 
(Smolyan 2013, 58). These two elements are reflected in strategems that have existed in China for over 
3000 years and are recorded in the book 36 Strategems, which also belongs to the ‘obligatory reads’ on 
strategy. The term is derived from a Greek word, which was used to describe military deception and 
refers to an algorithm or a calculated scheme aimed at achieving a hidden goal. It takes multiple factors 
into account, such as object’s psychology, his situation and current circumstances (Smolyan 2013, 59). 
Another classic strategic notion is that of Clausewitzian friction according to which one should always 
reckon with the fact that he cannot foresee all of the countless minor accidents happen during a 
confrontation and should be able to adjust to the situation (Lonsdale 2016, 35).  
Reflexive control can be seen as synonymous to psychological manipulation that has been used for 
strategic purposes intuitively for centuries (Смолян 2013, 54, 56). However, there is complex body of 
theory behind it. The basic objective of reflexive control is to trick an adversary, partner or a group of 
people into making a decision, which has been predetermined by the instigator. It can be achieved by 
provocative actions or controversial statements, which would puzzle the opponent and make him 
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abandon his initial plans or act irrationally. The instigator can also adjust his own consecutive actions 
according to this response. Information, carefully prepared and conveyed in a certain way, is a crucial 
means of reflexive control (Thomas 2015, 456). This concept gives insight into the main principles of 
Russian information warfare.  
Reflexive control theory has been developed in Russia in the midst of the Cold War by Vladimir 
Lefebvre, a mathematician, who was working at a secret military institute at that time. He was fascinated 
by the game theory, which has only stared to make its way into the Soviet Union back then. Game theory 
studies mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between rational actors that allow to predict 
their decisions. However, Lefebvre found that it per definition ignores opponent’s intellect, because the 
core assumption of game theory is that the players choose strategies, which will guarantee them 
minimum loss regardless of the intellectual level of the adversary. It inspired him to build a model, which 
would allow the player to reflect on himself and others during the decision-making process and be able to 
outsmart an opponent who follows game theory. Reflexive theory became the Soviet answer to the 
widely accepted and used by the US Ministry of Defense during the Cold War game theory. Lefebvre 
himself emigrated to the US later in the seventies and continued to work at various aspects of this 
comprehensive theory throughout his entire life (Karnaukh 2013).  
However, Lefebvre’s original theoretical model is rooted in Boolean algebra and is too complex to be 
applied here, so the emphasis will be primarily on deception and techniques or strategems that are used 
for establishing reflexive control over opponent. This particular application of the theory seems to be the 
focus of Russian military experts, who often refer to it without naming the term explicitly. Paradoxically, 
the conjunction ‘reflexive control’ is often used in the Western sources to describe the Russian practice of 
predetermining opponents decisions in its favor, while Russian authors would in most cases take this 
notion for granted and proceed to its practical application (Giles 2016, 19).  
In this sense, ‘predetermining’ is not exactly the right term here. The instigator might not know yet 
what he is aiming at, but by manipulating others, he will be able to decide what course of actions is best 
(Makhnin 2013, 46; Thomas 2015, 457). According to Chausov, reflexive control is a goal-oriented process 
of deliberate transfer of misleading information to the opponent aimed at affecting his decisions in own 
advantage. Therefore, it constantly needs updating and adjustment, while the initiator should also be 
able to anticipate the adversary’s actions and be able to reflect on his response (Smolyan 2013, 57). In 
order to successfully achieve it, one needs to use diverse deceptive techniques interchangeably, 
otherwise the opponent will easily uncover that he is being manipulated. Sergey Komov known in the US 
as one of the most influential information warfare theorists described this in Military Thought as what he 
called an ‘intellectual approach’ to information warfare (Smolyan 2013, 57). In a conflict that involves 
reflexive control, the side that is better able to imitate the opponent’s way of thinking or foresee his 
behavior, and thus has a higher level of reflection, has the most chances to win. Once the reflexive control 
is established, it allows to influence the opponent’s plans, his vision of the situation and the way he is 
going to act. 
Lefebvre gives examples of reflexive control application in personal relationships, military decision-
making, justice, social processes, international relations – in short, any situations with more than two 
intelligent actors involved, so that the theory is especially well fitted for political conflicts (Karnaukh 
2013). In this regard, he builds on Robert Putnam’s ‘two level games’, which explain the interaction of 
domestic and foreign policy levels in decision-making process. In order to successfully implement any 
decision, policy makers have to reckon with the constituencies on both levels, as the interests of domestic 
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audience do not always align with the state’s foreign policy. Reflexive control allows to differentiate 
between the two and take interests of all sides involved into account (Kriger 2007). 
Another important Russian concept, which has been influenced by the classical military thought and 
came about during the Second World War, is that of strategic maskirovka. It literally translates as 
‘camouflage’, ‘masking’ or ‘disguise’ and can refer to any complex of measures aimed at concealment of 
own plans, intentions, capacities and armed forces from the opponent(s) (Thomas 2015, 458). 
Operational and tactical maskirovka will not be considered in this research as it is primarily used during 
military operations. Strategic maskirovka though is an integral feature of traditional Russian military 
deception on a grand political scale. The annexation of Crimea by Russia in spring 2014 is an example of 
its brilliant execution in combination with other non-military asymmetrical methods of warfare in modern 
circumstances as has been discussed in this section (Lindley-French 2015). In an information 
environment, maskirovka equals disinformation and often accompanies reflexive control measures 
(Smolyan 2013, 59).  
However, this approach is far broader than just ‘smart’ disinformation, even though deception plays a 
crucial role in it. Reflexive control involves comprehensive measures, which target as many factors that 
can influence opponents decision-making as possible. Because of its complexity, it allows for theoretical 
overlaps between various techniques which are being used interchangeably:  
“Traditionally the Russian military mind, as embodied in the General Staff, looks further ahead than its Western 
counterpart, on the basis that ‘foresight implies control.’ Having made the ‘decision,’ the military mind works 
backwards from the selected objective to its present position. Subsidiary goals are identified for achieving the 
objective. Control of an opponent’s decision is achieved by means of providing him with the grounds by which he 
is able logically to derive his own decision, but one that is predetermined by the other side.” (Blandy 2009, 2)  
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Chapter II: The Grand Scheme 
The wave of democratic revolutions coincided with Russia’s reassertion of regional hegemony, which 
virtually started when Vladimir Putin came to power. From the onset, his political agenda was affected by 
the fact that since the fall of the Soviet Union Russia has been suffering from the ‘lost empire syndrome’ 
due to its loss of power and a sense of humiliation that came from that – once a world superpower, it 
undoubtedly was hurt to no longer be in such a privileged position. Unresolved border security issues 
added a rational element to this feeling, which was intensified by the revolutions in neighboring 
countries. The realization that such regime changes can be contagious has been there probably already 
since the Velvet and Singing Revolutions. It was perhaps for a reason that democratization came to be 
seen as synonymous to destabilization and thus formed a serious security threat for Russia according to 
the Kremlin (Silitski 2010, 340; Thomas 2015, 458).  
Color revolutions of the early 2000’s were widely welcomed in the post-Soviet countries as a prospect 
of democracy and prosperity. It was the period of civil society awakening as NGO’s modelled after the 
Serbian Otpor, which has initiated the Bulldozer Revolution, started to appear in other countries – for 
example, Pora! In Ukraine, Kmara in Georgia and Zubr in Belarus. Civic activism became a norm and 
people started to share typically Western liberal democratic values, look up to the EU as an ideal to strive 
towards. At the same time, quite predictably, these democratic revolutions led to a backlash across 
Eurasia. Authoritarian regimes in countries like Belarus, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan started to converge 
and consolidate their power. There immediately came restrictions on civic activism and NGO’s, opposition 
parties became subject to political repression and independent election monitoring was consistently 
being disrupted, which signified a high degree of electoral corruption (Silitski 2010, 339-340). These 
countries almost per definition aligned with Russia as it became their guardian in a sense and stimulated 
the rapprochement with heavy subsidies and profitable trade deals in order to reinforce own sphere of 
influence (Khudoley 2016, 398; Cooley 2010). These processes were only further accelerated by the Arab 
Spring and Maidan of 2014 in neighboring Ukraine. Just like with Georgia before, Russia sought to 
destabilize Ukraine through economic pressure and later military force – now taking it a step further 
(Silitski 2010, 339).  
From the Russian official perspective, these revolutions were thus neither a result of structural 
problems and internal tensions in the post-Soviet countries nor a mere coincidental ‘cross-
contamination’:  
“Revolutions toppled the regimes loyal to Russia one after another. Could it be a coincidence? Maybe someone 
has created an effective system of constant revolutions – ‘rose’, ‘orange’ and others, and this someone 
completely disregards the laws of these countries?” (Zuev 2009)  
In short, they were all invariably ascribed to the subversive influence of Western soft power (Sivkov 
2013; Khudoley 2016, 390-391; Giles 2016, 41). The Kremlin claimed that Otpor, Pora and Kmara were all 
sponsored and ‘curated’ by the US strategists – as these NGO’s indeed accepted financial support from 
the US and publicly took credit for their role in the color revolutions  (Cooley 2010, 64). Gene Sharp’s 
‘handbooks’ on nonviolent action and democratic revolutions, which inspired many protesters, served as 
a proof of Western intervention. However, during the square revolutions, the emphasis shifted away 
from NGO’s as by that time many have already perished to the role of social media, which according to 
Moscow, were controlled by the US (Sivkov 2013, 1; Giles 2016). It is remarkable, how technical this 
vision is. Soft power is not seen just as vague economic or cultural appeal, but a strategy, consciously and 
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purposefully implemented by ‘the West’ against Russia, with the NGO’s and social media being its 
instruments. Of course, these unapologetic accusations are not based on objective facts or even Kremlin’s 
sincere beliefs but rather provide justification for own response. The underlying discourse will be 
discussed in the last chapter. This chapter first explains Russian foreign policy in realist terms from an 
academic perspective and then proceeds to its military strategic implications, as grand strategy overlaps 
with the foreign policy or even equals it at the highest level of command (Lonsdale 2016, 42).  
Russian foreign policy 
In Russian understanding, the US, NATO and EU are inseparably connected. This has been the case 
during the Cold War period and this image is now revived in accordance with the realist logic of ongoing 
competition in a hostile anarchic environment with no higher power above the states, which could 
guarantee stability and safety. However, that has not always been so. The Yeltsin presidencies and 
Vladimir Putin’s first term with the anti-terrorist coalition of September 2001 are seen as the 
‘honeymoon’ of Russia-West relations, as well as the Medvedev interregnum of 2008 – 2012 (Khudoley 
2016, 389). It is striking how these periods coincided with the absence of revolutions, and how much 
harsher Russian policy became during the color revolutions during the Putin’s second presidential term 
(2004 – 2008) and square revolutions, during his current term (2012 – present) respectively. Overall, 
these periods of rapprochement resulted in a huge disappointment for the Kremlin as Russia took the 
democratic revolutions as a ‘personal offense’. 
For Russia, maintaining stability in the CIS region is key, not only for geopolitical reasons and ‘balance 
of power’, but also because it is closely intertwined with the domestic situation. Any social unrest or 
regime changes in the region, especially when they are not in Russia’s favor, undermine it. When the 
color revolutions started breaking out, Moscow shifted its domestic policy priority to enhancing state 
control over virtually all spheres of life, abandoning its plans to implement comprehensive social and 
economic reform during Putin’s second presidency (Petrov 2010, 69). At the same time, Russian 
increasingly assertive foreign policy in 2004 – 2008 led to more and more open clashes with the West 
(Duncan 2012, 2). The post-Soviet states felt ‘sandwiched’ in between the two and faced the problem of 
making a choice in favor of either Russian-led or European integration (Korosteleva 2011, 9). Needless to 
say, their choice for the latter was not welcomed by Russia. 
Russia was determined to prevent further spread of the color revolutions, as they threatened its 
power in the CIS region considerably: 
“Based on the experience of the collapse of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia, and on the examples of the color 
revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and elsewhere, one can clearly see that major threats do objectively 
exist and are implemented not only by military means, but primarily by covert and overt methods of political and 
diplomatic, economic, and information influence, various subversive actions and interference in the internal 
affairs of other countries. In this regard, Russian security interests require not only to assess these threats but 
also to determine appropriate measures to respond to them.” (Yuriy Baluyevsky, former First Deputy Minister of 
Defense and Chief of the General Staff in 2004-2008, cited in Giles 2016, 41) 
Thus, the eastward expansion of NATO has been identified as one of such threats. Moreover, it 
became increasingly associated with the EU integration and the two became synonymous as the 
countries which have had successful revolutions, for example Georgia and Ukraine, showed desire to join 
both the NATO and EU (Wilson 2010, 29; Dragneva & Wolczuk 2014, 221; Kuzio 2017, 104). Once having 
established this perspective, Moscow found itself caught up in a security dilemma, where it could no 
longer not react to the NATO expansion and EU integration initiatives in the region and felt threatened by 
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these processes (Mearsheimer 2013, 80). Layer after layer, Russian responses to every action of the 
West, which in Kremlin’s opinion had to do with its own sphere of influence, were adding up until they 
indeed started to pose a real threat of conflict escalation, even if this has not been so from the onset.  
The decisive turn in Russian foreign policy came in 2012, when Putin reassumed presidency. According 
to the Kremlin’s quite realist reasoning, when the Cold War ended, the world became unipolar with the 
US remaining the only superpower. However, its power has been dwindling ever since. In the Foreign 
Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of 2013, it was stated that the balance of power has definitely 
shifted from the ‘historical West’ to the East and the world has now become multipolar again. New 
players were entering the international arena, so Russia had to seize the opportunity and make itself one 
of the centers of this new multipolar world while at the same time turning to the East and making new 
alliances with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region (although this particular foreign policy aspect has 
not proven successful) (Khudoley 2016, 388).  
Color revolutions have been one of the reasons for Russia’s renewed assertiveness and especially the 
Orange Revolution deserves special attention as a crucial point in this policy change. Russia regarded 
Ukraine as the most important strategic partner in the post-Soviet space. Compared to its rather passive 
role during the Georgian Revolution of Roses, the Kremlin took Ukrainian case much further (Wilson 
2010, 29). Ukrainian participation was necessary for any of the Russian-led integration projects to 
succeed, but Ukraine was quite reluctant to commit to any of these initiatives out to fear that it could 
compromise its own sovereignty. Thus, Russia started getting more and more cynical in its attempts to 
get Ukraine onboard, especially given the rent-seeking behavior of Ukrainian political elites. After the 
Orange Revolution, Ukraine’s ‘European choice’ had become evident and the Kremlin started to exploit 
the existing economic and power asymmetry between the two states openly in order to obtain coercive 
power over its unaccommodating neighbor (Dragneva & Wolczuk 2016, 680-681, 693). Energy resources, 
or gas, to be more precise, has always been one of the main manipulation instruments in Russia’s 
negotiations with other countries. In this case, it worked even better as Ukraine was the biggest 
consumer of Russian gas and the history of disputes over gas prices long predated the Orange Revolution. 
In 2009, Russia even cut off gas exports to Ukraine as Putin sought to discredit the Ukrainian leadership 
internationally by exposing it as an untrustworthy partner for the EU and NATO (Wilson 2010, 30-31; 
“Interview Vladimira Putina” 2009). 
Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU), initially modelled after the EU and formed in 2014 is one of Russia’s 
most recent major integration projects, which required participation of Ukraine. However, Ukraine was 
more inclined to accept the Association Agreement offer form the EU as it had great symbolic meaning 
for the population. The protests on Maidan broke out in the end of 2013, when president Yanukovych 
refused to sign the agreement in Vilnius due to the last minute CIS FTA deal from Putin (Kuzio 2017, 106). 
Yanukovych then proved to be incapable of managing the situation and reacted to it inadequately. His 
decision to use violence against the protesters ushered in the second radicalized stage of the revolution 
and in February, he fled the country. By the spring, Russia has annexed Crimea and the conflict in Donbas 
region has started (Portnov 2015, 726). The Kremlin regarded this revolution as coup d’état and at first 
referred to the new government as ‘Kiev junta’. Moreover, Russia has never openly acknowledged its 
military presence in Eastern Ukraine. 
The square revolutions have thus finalized Russia’s ‘ideological’ break with the West and reaffirmed its 
strategic foreign policy choice to struggle for more power. The Kremlin’s position on the Arab spring and 
square revolutions was just as unambiguous as before:  
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“Look at the situation that has unfolded in the Middle East and the Arab world. It is extremely bad. There are 
major difficulties ahead... We need to look the truth in the eyes. This is the kind of scenario that they were 
preparing for us, and now they will be trying even harder to bring it about.” (“Dmitry Medvedev” 2011) 
It has intensified the security dilemma as now every following step by the Kremlin had to be more 
radical than the previous one, otherwise it would be perceived as a step back. In one of his interviews, 
Vladimir Lefebvre perfectly explained this Russian two-level game. In 1986, he cooperated with the US 
administration in preparation of the Reagan-Gorbachev conference in Reykjavik. Lefebvre pointed out 
how the Soviet leader was dependent not only on the reaction of his interlocutor, but on that of the 
domestic population as well, so it was agreed that there would be two official declarations. Reagan 
announced a compromise, while Gorbachev was still able to present the reduction of tension as a 
unilateral step of the USSR, meaning to show that he was strong enough to afford to turn back. Likewise, 
Putin too cannot afford to turn back now, and that is why he must saber-rattle, fly in a jet fighter and 
pretend to be a superman. For him, this is a zero-sum situation, where both sides cannot end conflict 
without one of them losing face. There has to be a loser and a winner (Кригер 2007). 
‘Use that is made of force’ 
Many high-ranked officials from Putin’s nearest surrounding, including Putin himself, have a 
background in military or security services. These siloviki allegedly became the dominant power group 
during his second presidential term – that is when the color revolutions were breaking out (Duncan 2012, 
1). However, the term itself should be used with caution as it can also have negative connotations. 
Russian media sometimes use the word ‘siloviki’ to indicate dictatorial or illegitimate regimes in other 
countries. For example, ‘Ukrainian siloviki’ often refers to Ukrainian armed forces that take part in the 
Anti-terrorist Operation in Donbas region in order to avoid calling them an army, which would 
automatically imply a war.  
The former Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov, Gerasimov’s predecessor, described modern 
warfare as ‘the use of political, economic and information pressure and subversive actions, followed by 
the unleashing of armed conflicts or local wars, that result in relatively little bloodshed’ (Giles 2016, 42). 
As it has already been noted, military actions play quite a modest role in this grand scheme, although 
they do form its most visible part. Considering the comment by Valery Gerasimov on the operational ratio 
of 4:1 between non-military and military measures, the focus is definitely on information warfare. It has 
become especially relevant since 2014, when it really drew the attention of Western experts and Russian 
media started to speak of information warfare openly, of course accusing the West of waging it against 
Russia (Tretyakov 2016; Giles 2016, 3). This shift to asymmetrical strategy is the Russian answer to soft 
power, which is from the Russian perspective per definition Western and destructive:  
“The Arab Spring and color revolutions have demonstrated the effectiveness of soft power, which exceeds the 
impact of traditional armed forces. Only the West, or the US to be more precise, could stage these operations, as 
only Washington has the necessary instruments for this.” (Sivkov 2013, 1) 
However, despite the fact that information warfare is quite new as phenomenon and much more 
narrowly defined in the West, it has become an integral feature of Russian political life years before the 
Maidan. Information warfare has in fact been around in Russian strategic thinking since the early years of 
the Soviet Union, when the notions like ‘ideology’ or ‘propaganda’ bore no negative connotations and 
were an object of lively theoretical inquiry (Giles 2016, 17). In 2014, it has definitely made a comeback. 
Now having explained why this has been the case in the first section, the second section deals with the 1 
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part of the Russian strategy that according to Gerasimov does involve the use of armed forces and serves 
as an auxiliary means for the remaining 4 parts of the actual information warfare, which will be discussed 
in the next chapter. Information warfare is in essence non-military, but the theory does originate from 
military strategy, so it is logical to start with the base. In this section, it has been narrowed down to a case 
study of the escalation during the Russia-Ukraine crisis relations as they are most relevant in regard to the 
Russia’s response to democratic revolutions and as a backdrop for the current information war. 
Frequent accusations of the US, NATO and Ukraine in military preparations against Russia coincided 
with Russia’s own buildup and served as an excuse for it. However, Russia’s concerns were not entirely 
unfounded. The eastward expansion of NATO did involve moving its military infrastructure closer to the 
Russian border, which can arguably be seen as a real security threat (Harding 2016). Besides, numerous 
border issues have been lingering since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and were never thoroughly 
addressed in the past, so that NATO’s proximity to Russia and a prospect of a direct border between 
Russia and a NATO country – Russia’s worst nightmare, automatically brought these issues to the surface. 
As it has already been noted, the democratic revolutions in the post-Soviet countries were per definition 
pro-European and almost per definition brought along the desire of these countries to join the NATO. 
During the Orange Revolution, it became clear that Ukraine is leaning towards the EU and NATO. After 
the Revolution of Dignity, this choice became definite. Despite all the prognoses that Ukraine will not join 
the EU or NATO in the nearest 10-20 years (Kuzio 2017, 104), the intention is there and it will 
undoubtedly be followed by further cooperation, so that Russia does have reasons to be concerned about 
its neighbour.  
Crimea kept coming back onto Russian political agenda since the early nineties, along with the Black 
Sea Fleet status problem. In 1995, the fleet was split between Russia and Ukraine and in order to be able 
to keep it in Crimea, Russia had to lease the naval bases from Ukraine. Obviously, the Russian leadership 
saw this solution as temporary and strategically unsatisfactory. There were no guarantees that the 
Russian Black Sea Fleet will be able to stay there in the future and the loss of Crimea would have been a 
huge blow for Russia, especially combined with the NATO expansion in the region. Hence, when the 
political situation in Ukraine definitely destabilized during the Maidan revolution of 2014, Putin decided 
to take the chance he otherwise would not have had. Besides, before Vilnius Russia still had hope to get 
Ukraine committed to participation in one of the Russian-led integration projects, but when the 
Euromaidan broke out, this hope had waned. 
The annexation of Crimea is a clear-cut example of the Kremlin’s ‘own peculiar logic’ shaped along the 
principles of Realpolitik. In this case, it was meant to secure the Black Sea Fleet and Russia’s own 
geostrategic position in the region. Moreover, it is also a perfect execution of maskirovka, when the 
whole peninsula was overtaken very swiftly, with no armies on the march, no shots fired and almost no 
victims save for a few minor incidents with Ukrainian border guards. Crimea was then heavily militarized 
by Russia and the build-up continues still (Harding 2016; Thomas 2015, 447). This political reality is 
however entirely different from the official discourse that was presented to the domestic public. Here all 
the emphasis was on historical continuity of Russian presence in Crimea, illegitimacy of its transfer to 
Ukraine by Khrushchev and respectively, the legitimacy of Russian claims (Morozova & van Meurs 2015, 
37-42). 
Conflict in the East of Ukraine was next. Russia keeps denying its military presence there and the 
military insignia, munition and identities of its soldiers remain masked. Putin has also signed an act 
according to which the list of classified information has been extended and now includes the information 
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about Russian military losses in peacetime and during special operations. Of course, in the era of 
information it is impossible to entirely control the information flows and conceal all ‘unwished’ 
information, but the tactical and strategic maskirovka measures the Kremlin takes do appear to work as 
Russia is rarely directly accused of aggression against Ukraine (Denisenko 2015). Here, paradoxically 
enough, military force is being used for compellence to prove that Ukraine will not achieve anything by 
using military force itself and pressure it into giving up on Crimea and Donbas and taking a more 
moderate position (Lonsdale 2016, 63). This conflict has become one of the ‘local wars, that result in 
relatively little bloodshed’ (for Russia) mentioned by Makarov unleashed out of strategic considerations 
(Giles 2016, 42). However, this conflict is only a part of Russian asymmetrical approach.  
While the Ossetia conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008 has been largely ignored by the West, 
this time the international community stood up against Russia, although it did not go further than open 
disapproval, non-recognition and sanctions, against which Kremlin held out quite well (Khudoley 2016, 
397; Thomas 2015, 449). Russia still has close ties with big European economies, some supporters among 
European politicians, including a strong lobby in Germany, and is a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council, with a say in the Syrian conflict, Iranian nuclear talks and other crucial global security 
issues. Moreover, it always can play the gas card (Thomas 2015, 448-450). All of this allows Putin to 
continue his military game in the region without completely cutting ties with the West. 
There is a comprehensive military reform underway in Russia, in what Sergey Shoygu calls the 
‘southwestern strategic direction’ – that is the Southern and Western military districts. It has been 
officially announced for 2008 – 2020. Currently, Russia is deploying troops and forming new divisions 
along the previously almost unmanned Ukrainian border, as according to Shoygu, the threat from Ukraine 
and the NATO is growing. The military build-up intensified in late summer 2016, when Russia held the 
largest Southern District military exercises of the year, with the Black Sea Fleet maneuvers in Sevastopol 
and tank drills in Transnistria. Despite being previously announced, these exercises were primarily seen as 
a provocation and made many Western experts wonder whether Russia is preparing for war 
(Radziwinowicz & Andrusieczko 2016; Ramani 2016).  
By this display of military force, Russia definitely went beyond the Ukrainian crisis and made a 
statement to the NATO. In military terms, this case of posturing served a purpose to contain NATO but 
paradoxically led to the biggest NATO build-up in the Eastern Europe since the Cold War. The ‘Enhanced 
Forward Presence’ programme has been the result of the 2016 Warsaw Summit and is now being 
implemented in the Baltic states and Poland for defense purposes (Harding 2016; “Boosting NATO’s” 
2017). Thus, while both sides aim at deterrence of each other, they are caught up in a vicious circle of 
action and reaction as explained by the spiral model or security dilemma. In fact, in the early 2000’s, 
during the honeymoon of Russia-West relations, there was even a discussion on whether Russia should 
join the NATO. However, the color revolutions marked a considerable crack in these relations, while the 
Arab Spring and the Euromaidan in Kiev, which resulted in the Russia-Ukraine crisis, have finalized the 
break and the saber-rattling has only become louder ever since.  
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Chapter III: Technical Implementation 
The Kremlin’s new foreign policy received support of the popular majority contributing to the sky-high 
official presidential rating of 86% and is unlikely to change in the near future (Khudoley 2016, 388; Politov 
2016). It was brought about by the democratic revolutions, which undoubtedly posed a security threat for 
Russia and had to be dealt with immediately. The revolutions called the legitimacy of Kremlin’s authority 
in question, but at the same time, Putin was able to pose himself as a strong leader and win broad public 
support by responding to them the way he did. It has already been discussed how the Kremlin blamed the 
revolutions on the Western actors, who were using soft power against Russia. However, the fact that the 
structural domestic causes were typically being overlooked in the official discourse does not mean that 
they were completely disregarded, on the contrary: 
“Understanding of the ways soft power can be used against a state is crucial for its security. Its use is only 
possible if there are necessary social prerequisites inside this state. The most important ones, judging from the 
experience of the revolutions in the post-Soviet space and the Arab world, are strong income inequality, reduced 
social mobility, isolation of the ruling elites, flourishing corruption and lawlessness. In modern Russia almost all of 
these prerequisites do exist, which means that the probability of external forces attempting to initiate a regime 
change in our country is high.” (Sivkov 2013, 10) 
According to the securitization theory, framing the democratic revolutions as such a threat allowed for 
extra harsh measures to be taken so that the Russian leadership could reassert its position and claim even 
more power. These measures were not directed at solving the structural problems, which made Russia 
susceptible to a next revolution as that would require a great deal of time, effort and resources. Instead, 
the Kremlin resorted to the proven methods of propaganda that can be defined as a deliberate attempt 
to shape public opinion in order to achieve desirable response by means of manipulating information 
(Shakhrai 2015, 30). The political turmoil in neighboring countries served as an external stimulus to 
detract the people from domestic issues, while the NATO expansion and military activity in Eastern 
Europe was used to justify the Kremlin’s own revanchist sentiment (Harding 2016).  
These processes were accompanied by the rise of the so-called ‘political technologies’ 
(политтехнологии), a Russian term that indicates an instrumental approach to propaganda and 
ideology. It refers to the methods, procedures and tactics used by the politicians for achieving political 
goals and solving political or administrative issues. Political technologies are aimed at influencing people’s 
opinions and therefore include methods of psychological manipulation for shaping public perceptions and 
imposing certain norms and values as desired by the initiator(s). This term is widely being used in the 
Russian media and strangely enough only bears negative connotations when it is applied to ‘the Western 
political technologies’ (or ‘technologists’) in order to justify Russian propagandist response (Wilson 2011; 
“Ponyatie politicheskih” 2017). Moreover, the term ‘orange technologies’ denotes precisely the use of 
political technologies by foreign actors during the color revolutions against Russia and refers directly to 
the Orange Revolution in particular (Wilson 2010, 26). At the same time, it also serves as an overarching 
term for a vast array of techniques and methods used by Russia in its information warfare against the 
West, as for now there are no doubts that this war is real for Kremlin:  
“Is it possible to stay aside of an information war if it has been unleased against you? Yes, it is. But then you will 
most definitely lose and you will have to capitulate sooner or later. Therefore, a refusal to participate in an 
information war that has already started against your country is a treason.” (Tretyakov 2016) 
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This chapter, again, combines an academic approach for general analysis and a practical one for a 
more detailed assessment of the information warfare techniques. It is founded on the realist premises of 
a zero-sum game and security dilemma as explained in the previous chapter. This is where the democratic 
revolutions as a security threat come in. They indeed posed a vital threat for the regime’s existence, as is 
clear from the official discourse and frequent accusations of the West in actions against Russia, which is 
also a clear sign that Putin is in a position of weakness. At the same time, the democratic revolutions 
became crucial for the renewed consolidation of power as the Russian leadership was able to exploit 
them its own advantage and create an illusion of strength and stability. The first chapter explains this 
process of ideologization through the concepts of securitization and dispositives. Here, revolution 
dispositive applies to particular cases of revolutions and their framing in official discourse, while the main 
security dispositive, which is founded thereupon, focuses primarily on the reassertion of state sovereignty 
and regime legitimation. The second section analyzes the application of reflexive control techniques in the 
ongoing information war that is fought in peacetime and against own population, with propaganda being 
one of its main aspects (Makhnin 2013, 337-40; Thomas 2015, 456-457). 
State and ideology 
In the official discourse, which in essence is aimed at securitization of the democratic revolutions by 
articulating them as a security threat, Moscow especially emphasizes the notion of legitimacy of the 
ruling governments, unlawfulness of their deposition and thus illegitimacy of any popular revolution by 
default. It goes hand in hand with the distinct Russian understanding of sovereignty. According to Putin, 
‘respect for sovereignty means no tolerance for coup d états, anti-constitutional actions or unlawful 
deposition of legitimate authorities’ (Khudoley 2016, 393). The so-called ‘controlled chaos’ theory 
developed by US foreign policy expert Steven Mann has been regarded by Russian strategists as an 
instrument of the Western soft power used during the democratic revolutions to provoke regime change 
and a means of furthering US national interests, which involves implanting Western ideology in the post-
Soviet space. 
In correspondence with the realist notion of anarchy, Steven Mann argues that the world is chaotic, 
because political actors have divergent objectives and values, hence the ever-present potential for 
conflict. These conflicts always involve a change in status quo and reorganization of power relations. 
Nevertheless, the change is not always negative and the conflicts are not entirely uncontrollable. It is 
possible to bring a political system into a state of ‘political criticality’ in order to provoke chaos, which will 
bring about the desired reorganization and transformation. Given globalization and the advantage US has 
in communication technology, it can use the controlled chaos technology in other countries to stimulate 
regime change in accordance with its own national interests (Prav 2016; Lepsky 2010; Bartosh 2014).  
From the Russian perspective, this is a self-replicating ideological virus meant to undermine Russian 
power position. Quite notably, an ‘accelerated promotion of liberal democracy, support for market 
reforms, call to increase the living standard and open disregard for the established values and ideology’ 
are not perceived as signs of positive changes, but as a direct proof of the Western attempts to create 
controlled chaos in the post-Soviet countries, including Russia, which culminated in the ‘orange 
revolutions’ (Lepsky 2010, 8). The revolutions in Ukraine serve in this case as the most outspoken 
example of controlled chaos, as Putin warned against ‘Ukrainization of Russian politics’ pointing out the 
instability of pluralist democratic systems (“Putin” 2010). Surprisingly, in Russian thinking, seemingly 
positive changes are described as extremely bad because of their connection with the democratic 
revolutions:  
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“This creates a specific environment of weakened national spirit and state decay, where all sorts of extremist 
movements begin to flourish. Deideologization, pluralism, disregard for traditional norms and values, sharp 
increase in material demands, loss of control over economy  and unruliness of supposedly independent 
democratic movements – all of this indicates deliberate attempts to implant controlled chaos with a single goal to 
dismantle the existing national states, their culture and traditions and create a society of people with erased 
historical memory. This is a global information war.” (Lepsky 2010, 8) 
It is noteworthy that for the phrase ‘independent democratic movements’ the author deliberately 
picked a Ukrainian word samostiyny (самостійний, or in this case самостийный spelled in Russian) 
instead of the Russian equivalent samostoyatelny (самостоятельный). This tiniest detail has a very 
charged meaning and brings along quite obvious connotations. Firstly, it links all of the said above to a 
particular case, namely the Orange Revolution in Ukraine therefore providing extra empirical proof for 
the argument, and secondly, independence and freedom are described as negative phenomena, pointing 
in the direction of democratic revolutions and civic activism as a whole. Moreover, it has been made clear 
that these movements were nothing else but the result of efforts by the Western actors.  
By continuously presenting the democratic revolutions in the post-Soviet countries as a security 
threat, the Kremlin has created a security dispositive around them. This dispositive applies to Russia itself, 
where such revolution has to be prevented at all costs and is based on a revolution sub-dispositive, which 
is tied primarily to the Orange Revolution. It describes its utterly negative consequences and points out 
who exactly is to blame for that. In this way, the features of external security, which is the domain of 
foreign policy, are transferred onto internal security and thus become a domestic issue as well (De Graaf 
& Zwierlein 2013, 52-53). One the one hand, this was happening because the revolutions indeed formed 
an existential threat to the regime, especially as the Russian leadership did realize that all the 
preconditions were present in their country as well – hence such desperate unconcealed rhetoric against 
democratization, which even goes as far as interpreting calls for a higher standard of living as something 
negative (Sivkov 2013, 10; Khudoley 2016, 393). On the other, precisely because this issue was serious 
enough it was possible to link democratic revolutions to such crucial notions as sovereignty and 
legitimacy, and thus acquire emergency powers in order to protect the integrity of the state by taking 
measures against any form of political protest, which can potentially become a revolution in the future: 
“No political system in world history is without any structural problems or serious drawbacks. Such a system does 
not exist and never will. In Russia, we always assumed that we need a stable system, sensitive to changes 
happening in the world and our own country, which would ensure our sovereignty.” (“Putin” 2010) 
It was after the Orange Revolution that the Russian leadership started to systematically work at 
creating a viable ideology, which included renewed emphasis on patriarchic religious and family values, 
negative assessment of civic activism, especially if it involved participation in any form of protest, and a 
highly critical attitude towards the alien Western culture (Kurilla 2010, 74-75). Its introduction has been 
heralded by the Putin’s speech of 5 September 2005 – quite literally a speech act, and the launch of the 
Sovereign Democracy doctrine shortly thereafter (Kara-Murza 2005, 9; Wilson 2010, 22). Moreover, the 
fact that it is indeed connected to the color revolutions has been openly acknowledged, which further 
proves the hypothesis on securitization: 
“It is possible to avoid a revolution explosion in Russia by building a powerful state based on social principles.” 
(Sivkov 2013, 1) 
This powerful state has been embodied in the concept of Sovereign Democracy, Russian variant to the 
Western liberal democratic model developed by one of the Kremlin’s main ideologists Vladislav Surkov, 
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First Deputy Chief of the Presidential Administration (1999 – 2011). He identified the color revolutions as 
one of the three main security threats, with the other ones being international terrorism and Russia’s 
‘economic non-competitiveness’. According to Surkov, ‘orange technologies’ were meant to discredit the 
Russian leadership, undermine traditional values and provoke domestic unrest in Russia. Therefore, 
Sovereign Democracy was called to counter the negative effects that were ascribed to the democratic 
revolutions in surrounding countries. In order to create, legitimize and maintain a stable centralized 
political system, referred to as the ‘vertical of power’, Sovereign Democracy reinterpreted Russian 
patriarchal culture, as embodied in family values and religion, in political terms of national identity and 
specifically defined it as opposed to the West. 
The next issue that was addressed by this doctrine is that of civic activism because of the role NGO’s 
played during the color revolutions. According to Moscow, the US government has set up these ‘puppet’ 
organizations and was constantly providing them with ‘political technological support’ (Petrov 2010, 70). 
One of the key objectives of Sovereign Democracy was the creation of state controlled hierarchical civil 
society embodied by various semi-governmental organizations and youth movements, which would be 
capable of substituting independent NGO’s (Wilson 2010, 26; Casula 2013, 3). This process went hand in 
hand with the deconstruction of existing independent civil society networks through tougher legislation, 
bureaucratic pyramids and a more complicated registration procedure (Petrov 2010, 72).  
The number of political parties has declined drastically ever since. Thanks to the existing revolution 
dispositive, virtually any social or political movement, especially the opposition, could be labelled as bad, 
unpatriotic and treacherous, because according to the main security dispositive, stability of the existing 
political system was to be valued above all. As soon as this label is put on any opposition party, leader or 
organization, it automatically becomes an absolute evil within the new normative system. By referring 
back to the constructed image of devastating impact of the revolutions – and thus the negative effects of 
pluralism as a whole, which is seen as a threat to political stability and state sovereignty, the regime is 
able to reassert its own legitimacy at the cost of its perceived enemies. However, this also means that for 
the Kremlin such threat is real, so that it has to defend itself and take the drastic measures it has 
increasingly been taking since the revolutions started breaking out in the post-Soviet states. 
The Ukrainian Orange Revolution of 2004 has initiated the process of ideologization in Russia and 
brought back the notion of ongoing information war that involves extensive propaganda campaigns 
targeted at both domestic and international audiences accompanied by populism and retraditionalization 
(Casula 2013, 3). This information effort became more intense over the years and peaked when the 
Revolution of Dignity broke out in Ukraine. During the square revolutions, emphasis has shifted from 
NGO’s, which have long perished by that time, to media, social media in particular (hence the name 
‘facebook revolutions’) proving that information has become key to power.  
Propaganda 
Reflexive control can be used in almost every sphere of politics, military strategy or human 
communication and is well applicable to the previously discussed aspects of Russian information warfare. 
However, this topic is quite complex and would require a separate research, so the reflexive control 
techniques are understood here as strategems rather than elements of Lefebvre’s reflexive theory itself. 
This section is about manipulative information strategies and focuses specifically on domestic 
propaganda as one of the main aspects of information warfare. If we assume the Russian point of view 
that Western actors are using soft power against Russia and the controlled chaos model is one of its 
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weapons, reflexive control can be seen as one of the Kremlin’s main weapons in its information war 
against the West. Both strategies are suited for a non-military confrontation and imply a hidden ability to 
control the situation from ‘behind the scenes’, but in Russia’s case, deception is key. 
It must be noted however, that although this section primarily deals with domestic propaganda, 
Russian information campaigns are multilingual and target Russian-speaking audiences all over the world 
as well as international public. They do not just involve the mass media backed by the state, but also fake 
independent news outlets and so-called ‘information throw-in’s’ (информационные вбросы) or simply 
disinformation placed on reputable websites. This comprehensive approach to information warfare ties in 
with the Putin’s statement about asymmetrical and less costly measures based on intellectual superiority 
quoted earlier as manipulating information indeed requires much less material resources than developing 
a soft power appeal (Chekinov & Bogdanov 2010, 21). However, winning popular support inside the 
country remains vital for the regime to stay in power and the Russian international propaganda discourse 
goes along the same lines as the domestic one (Giles 2016, 47-48). After a brief discussion on the role of 
the Russian media as a means of information warfare, this final section will proceed to summarize the key 
elements and techniques of reflexive control and then take a closer look at their application during the 
Russia-Ukraine crisis. 
The main message conveyed through the state-controlled Russian media is that Russia is surrounded 
by the enemies, so the people should unite around their leader and prepare for hardship (Yarmush 
2017a). Moreover, while it seems that there are enough alternative sources of information, which offer 
divergent perspectives or have nothing to do with politics at all, the scope of state control over the mass 
media in Russia has been most likely underestimated. According to the research done by the team of 
Russia’s most prominent opposition activist Alexei Navalny, Russians are offered but an illusion of choice. 
Almost all Russian mass media are linked to Yuri Kovalchuk – Putin’s close acquaintance and the Chairman 
of the Bank of Russia Directors’ Board. In 2006, allegedly on the money received from the state, he 
bought the management company called Leader (Лидер), which is the owner of the country’s largest 
media holding Gazprom Media (Газпром медиа) via the Gazfond (Газфонд) and Gazprombank 
(Газпромбанк). Moreover, Kovalchuk also owns the National Media Group (Национальная медиа 
группа), including the Channel One Russia (Первый канал), and virtually controls STS Media (СТС Медиа) 
as well. Taken together, this means that he fully or partially controls all of the major Russian television 
channels, radio stations, newspapers and online news agencies, but also a vast array of minor leisure 
media, like television channels about gardening or science fiction where one would never expect to find 
propaganda or be manipulated in any way (Yarmysh 2017a; Milov 2012).  
So on the one hand, some media are officially state-backed, like the Channel One Russia, and openly 
propagandist as they primarily cover Russian politics. Russia Today is probably the most notorious one 
among them, launched by a former media group and now one of the world’s biggest information 
agencies RIA Novosti (РИА Новости) in 2005 – again, this was the same year when the Kremlin openly 
started working at a state ideology and taking decisive measures in reaction to the Orange Revolution. 
However, these are only the most visible platforms used in information warfare. There is a wide range of 
media that seem to have nothing to do with politics and do not avowedly support the government. 
Nevertheless, they are not free to publish or broadcast whatever they wish to and their output is carefully 
crafted to conform to the public expectations, while they have to strictly stay within the lines of the 
Kremlin’s official discourse (Yarmush 2017a). The Kremlin’s information campaigns were thus able to 
adopt and combine a number of approaches and apply them interchangeably in accordance with the 
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circumstances, particular audiences and types of media, ranging from sophisticated arguments and 
confusing information, to half-truths and outright fabrications (Giles 2016, 46-47).  
These highly adjustable and complicated information-psychological strategies are precisely what 
reflexive control is about. It is important to bear in mind that summing up all of them is virtually 
impossible, as the number of their possible combinations is inexhaustible, so it is more about grasping the 
general idea of reflexive control. There is a substantial body of theory behind it, which implies thorough 
knowledge of the opponent along with advanced analytics of the possible strategies and their outcomes 
based on a mathematical model.  
Military theorist Mikhail Ionov argued that it is necessary to combine different deceptive techniques in 
order to make them indistinguishable from one another (Smolyan 2013, 56). He identified four different 
elements of reflexive control. The first one is power pressure and demonstration of superior force, which 
can range from military posturing as discussed in the previous chapter, to psychological attacks, 
chauvinism, threats and ultimatums. The second method comprises diverse ways of providing false 
information by the means of disinformation (maskirovka), manipulation and deception in order to 
influence the opponent’s assessment of current situation and shape his objectives (Denisenko 2013). The 
third one is about influencing decision-making process of the opponent, for example by provoking him so 
that he would panic and undertake useless actions. Providing false comfort, on the contrary, can help 
make sure that he does not undertake anything, like in the case with the military build-up in the summer 
2016, when the Russian command assured everyone that military drills right across the border are 
completely normal and so there is nothing to worry about. The last important element of reflexive control 
is timing and the ways instigator can use it to amplify all of the above mentioned measures (Smolyan 
2013, 56). Following repetitive patterns in decision-making can help create an illusion of predictability, so 
that the effect of an unexpected last-minute move will be even greater than it would normally have been, 
in which case the opponent(s) or broad audience will not be able to react adequately when something 
really does happen. It might simply be too late, like it happened with the annexation of Crimea. Successful 
information operations should therefore combine several or all of these elements.  
Here, the term ‘opponent’ or ‘opponents’ originates from military strategic uses of reflexive control. 
However, it does not have to refer to an actual enemy and can be applied to any subject or audience 
targeted by the instigator, who wants to establish reflexive control. Needless to say, ‘the instigator’ is not 
a person and refers in this case rather to the whole Kremlin apparatus. Moreover, this comprehensive 
strategy is not just multi applicable, but actually has to be used on several levels simultaneously for best 
results and can always be tailored to a situation. Thus, propaganda in the news can serve as a 
smokescreen for military operations, or vice-versa – military operations can make a propaganda discourse 
more persuasive by equally deceitfully backing up words with deeds. 
One of reflexive control techniques frequently used in Russian propaganda is distortion of information, 
for example, when Russia is blaming Ukraine for military aggression while supporting the separatists in 
Donbas region and deploying troops to the Russian-Ukrainian border (Thomas 2015, 457; Smolyan 2013, 
57). Another similar form of distortion is the usage of analogies for creating strong emotional or 
psychological links, like that between the Nazi’s and Ukrainian nationalists. The 9th of May, Victory Day, is 
without exaggeration one of Russia’s main holidays and the memories of the Great Patriotic War (1941 – 
1945) are being kept as ‘live’ and touching as possible. It is not hard to imagine then, that once Ukrainian 
nationalists have been compared to the Nazi’s, especially involving actual historical arguments, the 
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connection becomes extremely powerful to the degree that it incites sincere hatred. Argumenty i Fakty, 
one of the Russia’s biggest weekly newspapers called the Euromaidan a ‘brown revolt’: 
“If any liberal will try to persuade you, that peaceful protesters in Kyiv are violently trying to protect their 
‘European choice’, you can be sure that this person is a liar without honor or conscience. Last week’s events have 
left no illusions: the mob in Kyiv is attempting a fascist coup.” (Sidorchyk 2014) 
While this message targets the Russian domestic audience, similar information effort has been 
undertaken in Ukraine (Shakhrai 2015, 29) and has been surprisingly successful, as in fact many 
Ukrainians believe that Putin was right to annex Crimea: 
“It so happened that the majority of the Crimean population consists of Russian speakers, Tatars and people of 
many other nationalities. These people have ancient traditions, history and cultural values of their own. They 
cannot throw everything at the feet of those, who choose Bandera as their leader and preach Nazism. Our 
grandfathers fought Nazis and shed their blood in order for us not to put their memory to shame.” (“Yanukovych-
mladshiy” 2014)  
In general, such ‘historical’ emphasis represents the main pro-Russian line in eastern Ukraine as well 
as elsewhere. However, such arguments are often reduced to a propaganda instrument, as both sides 
have enough valid reasons to claim the disputed territories for themselves. Similar analogies and 
accusations are increasingly being used to unify Russians against the NATO, EU or US (Thomas 2015, 456). 
Moreover, it is a psychological fact that people perceive negative information more easily than positive 
(Kuleshov 2014, 107), so that news about how bad Europe and America are doing and reports that 
discredit the governments of other countries are most welcome, especially when contrasted to the 
Russian realities. At the same time, this kind of easy to understand information that appeals to public is 
used to bury really valuable information in ‘white noise’, as it is not possible to control all of the 
information flows and conceal everything that should remain unknown, so that maskirovka in this sense 
closely overlaps with reflexive control (Denisenko 2015; Kuleshov 2014, 107).   
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Epilogue and Conclusion  
On 26 March, the biggest demonstrations since Bolotnaya movement of 2011 – 2013 took place in 
Russia. However, the Russian media kept remarkably silent on this day and none of the state-backed 
channels or websites mentioned the protests with tens of thousands participants in major cities and 
thousands of people arrested all over Russia, including Alexei Navalny himself (Higgins 2017). The 
demonstrations were addressed later on. Artyom Sheynin, the host of Studio One (Первая студия) talk 
show on Channel One Russia, urged the audience to think about the possible consequences of protest, as 
according to him, ‘that is why we are discussing Ukraine here every day in order to provide you with 
examples’. A day later, on the same talk show leader of the Communist Party Gennady Zyuganov called 
protesters the ‘new orange provocateurs’ (Yarmush 2017b).  
The second wave of protests organized by Navalny in 145 Russian cities is planned for 12 June, on 
Russia Day. Of course, it is not announced in the media either. However, the address posted on the 
website of one of St. Petersburg’s renown universities by the rectorate sums up the working of 
propaganda, which has penetrated almost every level and sphere of Russian daily life, quite aptly: 
“The 12th of June is a national holiday – the day of Russian sovereignty. In our beloved and most beautiful city in 
the world, St. Petersburg, various festivities will take place. Official (legally allowed) events will be taking place in 
various locations – their aim is to show support for the unwavering policy of president V. V. Putin to develop 
democracy, overcome economic hardship and cultivate civil society in our Motherland. You, Russian citizens, are 
the future of our country. You are politically active young people involved in solving pressing tasks and challenges 
that Russia is facing today. At the same time, according to reliable sources of information, among you there are 
supporters of opposition activist Alexei Navalny, who is planning to set up a number of provocations during the 
festivities by making use of the current difficult situation and students’ dissatisfaction with it.  Mass riots and 
violations of public order are illegal actions that can have uncontrollable consequences. What influence might this 
have on you? Would it not harm your future, the realization of your goals and your future career?! Think how 
harmful it can be for the prestige of our country, our city and the university you are studying at! Is it possible to 
bring about positive changes in the country? Yes, it is! In a lawful and democratic way! By studying and working 
hard! Do not give in to the provocations! Do not let the riots happen! Be prudent and be persistent!  
Rectorate of the Mechnikov North-West National Medical University.” (“Obrashchenie” 2017) 
 
Thus, democratic revolutions clearly continue to form a serious threat to the Russian leadership and 
are posed as a national security issue. It is remarkable how significant the influence of the color 
revolutions, especially the Orange Revolution, has been even despite that the recent events of 2013-2014 
caused much more turmoil and were greater in scope. It can probably be explained by the fact that in 
Russia the square revolutions are seen as a continuation of the process, which has been jumpstarted by 
the Western-instigated color revolutions. Putin spoke of the threat of an ‘orange revolution’ that has to 
be prevented at all costs as late as in 2017, especially relevant now with the presidential elections coming 
in 2018 (Malik 2017). 
In the meantime, as the regime felt threatened and therefore needed to reassert its legitimacy and 
power, information warfare has become a constant feature of Russian political life (Denisenko 2015). The 
launch of a new extensive propaganda campaign, which forms its significant part, has been justified by 
the Kremlin in terms of countering the subversive influence of Western soft power (Sivkov 2013; Giles 
2016, 41). This rhetoric surprisingly reminds of that during the Cold War, even though the current 
situation is not indisputably comparable with it. However, the Cold War has significantly influenced and 
Olga Morozova MA Russian and Eurasian Studies s1852213 
  
Leiden University | Faculty of Humanities 28 
 
indeed to a large extent shaped the discipline of IR, its subdisciplines, the Security and Strategic Studies, 
and the grand theories. The practical concepts and strategies used in information warfare by Russia, like 
that of reflexive control, came about under the circumstances of rivalry between Russia (the Soviet Union) 
and the West as well, so the bias is present in the very way of thinking about Russian foreign policy even 
from the theoretical point of view.  
Moreover, Russia still views the post-Soviet countries as its own legitimate sphere of influence and 
gets automatically involved with any political changes in the region for practical reasons too in order to 
maintain stability and power. The democratic revolutions brought the perennial issue of Russia-West 
relations to the fore once again (Wilson 2010, 33). The Russian leadership, in fact, found itself in a weak 
position, as it had to reassert both own legitimacy as well as Russian place on the international arena. At 
the same time, however, it was able to use the threat of democratic revolutions to consolidate own 
power and distract the population from domestic problems and make it unify against the external threats 
and enemies. As Russian opposition politician Grigory Yavlinsky has bitterly noted:  
“You think the ruling elite has no strategy? Wrong. It does have an unwritten strategy. Not a security or economy 
one, but the one for them to stay in power permanently. It is precisely this strategy that is being implemented right 
before your eyes.” (Yavlinsky, 2017) 
This research offers an outline of a theoretical framework that can account for the Russian reaction to 
the democratic revolutions that can be used for the analysis of Russian information warfare and its 
evolution between the Orange Revolution and the Russia-Ukraine crisis. Firstly, the realist notions of 
security dilemma and zero sum games help to explain the constant threat of conflict escalation and 
military build-up during the Russia-Ukraine crisis, which has been provoked by the Revolution of Dignity, 
but has been brewing already since the Orange Revolution. As Patrushev once stated, ‘the strong ones 
never get attacked’ (Patrushev 2013, 1), so if Putin would allow NATO to have the upper hand, he will 
show weakness and therefore lose. Moreover, he has to play this game on two levels simultaneously and 
demonstrate power to both international as well as domestic public. 
Secondly, the securitization theory shows how the democratic revolutions were put down as a security 
threat in the Russian official discourse by the means of dispositives. For the sake of argument, the 
revolution dispositive, which is subordinate to the main security dispositive, has been introduced based 
on the notion of conspiracies by Beatrice de Graaf. These dispositives describe the discourse used by the 
Kremlin to legitimize and justify tough securitization measures by identifying the democratic revolutions 
as an absolute evil and blaming them on the Western actors (De Graaf & Zwierlein 2013, 57). 
Thirdly, it has been proved that the use of military strategy does not imply an actual war or conflict 
and has significantly influenced the Kremlin’s foreign policy. Warfare in Russian understanding is more of 
an art of deception rather than a military act and can be used on multiple levels of policy or adjusted to 
any particular situation. Moreover, Russian military science itself is being transformed to better suit 
peacetime conditions and has shifted towards asymmetrical measures: 
“During the recent conflicts, new non-military forms of warfare have emerged. We must admit that despite we do 
have a thorough understanding of the essence of traditional military confrontation between the armed forces, 
our knowledge of asymmetrical strategies is quite limited. In this regard, the role of military science has become 
especially significant, as it now must come up with a coherent theory of this form of warfare. (Gerasimov 2013, 2) 
Lastly, the concept of reflexive control gives insight into these strategies. It allows to predetermine or 
predict opponents’ decisions and manipulate public opinion. If these techniques are applied right, it is 
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almost impossible to uncover and identify them because of the interplay and overlaps between different 
reflexive control elements. This might be what Putin called an intellectual asymmetrical approach as 
information effort does not necessarily require undertaking ‘real’ actions, although it can help prepare 
ground for them or create a smokescreen around the instigator’s actual capacities and objectives (Giles 
2016, 46). It must be noted, however, that the asymmetrical approach is meant for situations in which a 
weaker opponent has to face a stronger one.  
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